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The most important fact in the seventeenth-century history of sugar 
consists in the extension of its production to the Caribbean and the 
direct involvement of new European powers in this business, notably 
France and Great Britain. Both events are interrelated, and commerce 
with the Caribbean plantations would become increasingly mercantil-
istic, in spite of the role played by Dutch internationalist slave and 
sugar trades, as described by Pieter Emmer (Emmer 1991; 1998). On 
the other hand, Portuguese sugar production in Brazil was checked by 
the Dutch rule of the South Atlantic (1624-1654), and even Sicilian 
production, a Genoese investment, sees its final days in the seven-
teenth century, according to Antonino Morreale (2006). As the power 
of the Spanish monarchy declined, its rivals began a race of empire-
building, and sugar was directly involved.  
Some works also mention a certain diffusion of sugar consump-
tion in Europe in this period. The classic Geschichte des Zuckers, by 
Edmund von Lippmann, describes (vaguely) a process ongoing since 
the late sixteen hundreds by which sugar ceased to be a medicine or a 
luxury to appears at the commoners table. Sidney Mintz indicates the 
1650s as the time when sugar consumption became popular in Eng-
land. However, both authors recognize that the acceleration of sugar 
consumption among worker classes would be more important during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.1 Hence, geographical expan-
sion of the sugar cane, with its mills and slaves, and the involvement 
of new colonial empires in its trade are both prior to the consumption 
boom, so we shall focus on these events. 
Geographical expansion and renewed empire-building are interre-
lated facts. Sugar was one of the most strategic goods in international 
trade between the fifteenth and eighteenth century (at least), as a lux-
                                                     
1  Lippmann (1941: 157-158); Deerr (1949); Mintz (1985); Stols (1997: 127).  
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ury narcotic and as an energetic foodstuff. Even during the general 
crisis of the seventeenth century, sugar never lost its dynamism and 
capacity to open trade routes. In order to participate in this business, 
political connection to sugarcane-producing colonies was mandatory 
(Braudel 1996, II: 162). However, until the seventeenth century, the 
control of sugar production rested in Portuguese hands. Madeira 
reached its production peak in the 1530s, with approximately 5,000 
tons of sugar. São Tomé and the Canaries were the main producers in 
the mid-century − mainly due to Portuguese investment trying to 
avoid taxation from Madeira (Vieira 2006). Finally, Brazil emerged in 
the late 1570s as the most important sugar field  in 1614, Brazilian 
colonies produced approximately 10,280 metric tons of sugar. 
In spite of the virtual monopoly of Portuguese colonies in sugar 
production, there remains the fact that the main distribution centers 
were in Flanders. Throughout the sixteenth century until the Dutch 
occupation of 1585, Antwerp was the most important sugar port in 
Europe, followed by Rotterdam, Hamburg and Rouen. After that, it 
was Amsterdam that prevailed. These were the towns where buying 
and selling networks were in touch. In addition, much of the Portu-
guese overseas expansion was financed with Flemish capital, which 
came to the point of owning a few of the first sugar mills in American 
territory. That is to say, during most of the sixteen hundreds, sugar 
trade was a Portuguese staple business, yet it was open to foreign en-
terprise and largely dependent on Flemish connections. 
One may come up with a few good explanations for these events, 
in itself a good topic for debate. First, there are the political circum-
stances and demographical movements between Portugal and Flanders 
at the time. The drawing of sugar routes was influenced by the emi-
gration of Portuguese merchants accused of Judaism. Inquisitorial 
processes, particularly up to the 1620s, did not deny the possibility of 
communication between emigrants and their contacts in Portugal. 
According to David Grant Smith, this meant that merchant sojourn in 
foreign lands was restricted to New Christian exiles, with whom Old-
Christians from Portugal could arrange their business. That would 
explain the political weakness of the merchant elites and its lack of 
cohesion as a social group, despite the profound mercantile traits of 
the Portuguese Empire (Smith 1975: 161-162; Costa 2002, I: 133). 
Conversely, Flanders was a region of strongly decentralized politics, 
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inherited from its late middle-age organization and exacerbated during 
the sixteenth century by the wars of religion and the struggle for inde-
pendence. It was a home of tolerance and cosmopolitism, in which 
many of the merchant emigrants of Europe could find a liberal envi-
ronment (Mechoulan 1992). 
The second reason for the outwardness in the Portuguese sugar 
trade is the geo structure of European commerce at the time, still 
gravitating around the net of semi-autonomous towns along the Flan-
ders-Northern Italy axis. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries, the economic dynamism of the Northern Atlantic surpassed that 
of the Mediterranean, and the center of that world-economy shifted 
from the Italians to the Dutch. But the net of inland commerce, with 
its local fairs and markets, continued to be the base of European trade 
(Braudel 1996, II: 64). Portugal and Spain were secondary centers, 
constituting in fact a semi-periphery in the terms of Immanuell 
Wallerstein, despite the Habsburg predominance in the European po-
litical theatre (Wallerstein 1974; Arrighi 1996). 
The outward and cosmopolitan traits of the Portuguese sugar busi-
ness began to cause trouble in the late sixteenth century. The revolt of 
the Seventeen Provinces against Spanish rule and the dynastic union 
of the Iberian Crowns put the Portuguese and the Dutch on opposite 
sides. The fall of Antwerp had an important effect on the sugar trade, 
since merchant correspondents were forced to move. But the dyna-
mism of the European economy and the expansion of sugar production 
in Brazil − specifically, the structural turnover of the Portuguese 
colonial Empire, from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic (Godinho 
1971: 175)− mitigated the effects of the conflict. The volume of sugar 
trade continued to grow within the framework of Portuguese-Flemish 
cooperation, now centered at the Amsterdam market.2 
At the start of the seventeenth-century, production growth in Bra-
zil started to decelerate. By that time, Brazilian sugar production had 
reached a total of ten thousand tons per year. Simultaneously, a small 
boom occurred in the Spanish colonies. The second largest producer 
then was Mexico, although its output would never reach the two-
thousand-ton mark until the eighteenth century. Still, the sugar mill 
listings elaborated by Horacio Crespo indicates that sugar investment 
                                                     
2  A good summary of this discussion can be found in Emmer (2003).  
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accelerated between 1600 and 1630.3 The island of São Tomé, at this 
time, was reported to load forty ships every year  even though its 
sugar was notoriously bad, the proximity to slave markets probably 
helped to sustain that plantation. There was sugar production starting 
also in the Caribbean. In Cuba, there are indications of a boom be-
tween 1605 and 1617, with production growing from 10 to 312 tons 
(the first Cuban mill was dated as of 1598). Conversely, in Hispaniola, 
sugar production reached a low point of 222 tons in 1608, after an 
early boom in the previous century. In Puerto Rico, the little produc-
tion capacity previously installed was destroyed by a hurricane in 
1615, but as soon as 1620 four new sugar mills were built, and three 
more until 1647 (Deerr 1949: 109-138). While growth in the Brazilian 
colonies was losing pace, the association of the Castilian Crown with 
Portuguese merchants (slave traders in particular) probably accounts 
for a small spur of sugar production in the Spanish Empire. 
After 1620, political tension in the business turned into an open 
war. The European crisis of 1619-1622 forced bankruptcies and de-
valuations throughout the continent, implying the closure or dimin-
ishment of trade routes. With the end of the Twelve Year Truce be-
tween Spain and the United Provinces, followed by the escalation of 
war in the German countries, the Portuguese-Flemish sugar trade was 
caught in the crossfire. Besides the fast growth of Flemish corsair 
attacks on Portuguese navigation, jamming the flow of Brazilian sugar 
to Europe, the Habsburg embargo against the Dutch severely hindered 
re-exportations from Lisbon. At the same time, the Inquisition intensi-
fied its operations against New Christians, including the prohibition of 
the return of emigrants to Portugal. In 1622, a new system of customs 
inspection was created and foreign shipping was overtaxed, despite all 
protests from Lisbon. Many sought to conduct business in northern 
ports such as Oporto and Viana, where Spanish control was lighter. 
The Portuguese salt trade was also damaged, affecting the Dutch her-
ring industry  the Habsburgs were trying to divert that salt to the 
fisheries of Galicia and the Asturias. Not even ships that sailed under 
a neutral flag (English or Hanseatic) managed to escape the new in-
                                                     
3  See Crespo (1988). It should be stressed, however, that apparently this sugar 
industry is directed to Mexican internal demand. Mentz (1999) reminds that 
sugar can be a source of calories to a labor force working under near slavery con-
ditions. 
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spectors of the contraband administration, as it was named by the 
Lisbon townsfolk (Costa 2002). It is estimated that one fourth of the 
Dutch Sephardic population moved to neutral ports, especially Ham-
burg and other Hansa towns, and France and Italy in smaller scale. All 
of the Portuguese navigation resented the consequences of the Spanish 
embargo against the United Provinces. 
Above all, the charter of the Dutch West India Company in 1621 
marks the crisis of the former structure of the Portuguese-Flemish 
sugar trade. It is significant that the West India Company (WIC) was 
not really aimed at the preservation of a stable set of commercial ties. 
In fact, its charter found strong resistance within Amsterdam, indicat-
ing that a clash among merchant networks had occurred. It could be 
viewed as a mercantilistic policy by the States-General, seeking to 
seize control of the sugar supply from the hands of a foreign merchant 
group (Costa 2002, I: 135). After all, the debate on the companys 
objectives went between peaceful sugar producing in Curaçao and 
seizing Spanish ports in New Spain (Boxer 1957: 36). In any case, it 
was at least an effort to adjudicate the conflict between a traditional, 
cosmopolitan bourgeoisie and a new, rising, popular and nationalist 
one  an internal conflict that could hinder the Dutch fight against 
Spain. In the terms of Eddy Stols (1973: 47-50), it was nationaliza-
tion avant la lettre. As a result, Portuguese sugar merchants in Am-
sterdam were forced to choose between joining the WIC or transfer-
ring their businesses to another city outside the United Provinces. 
In Portugal, merchants were also divided. The end of the Truce, 
the reenactment of the embargo and the Dutch offensive on sugar and 
salt production in America were nothing but grim news to a vast group 
of merchant networks and middlemen. Nevertheless, an elite of finan-
ciers and slave traders were aligned with Madrid, especially after the 
asiento of Flanders of 1626 and the Spanish bankruptcy of 1627, when 
Phillip IV sought Lisbon to replace Genoese lenders  in 1630, it was 
said that one in four people living in Seville came from Portugal 
(Novinsky 1972: 42; Boyajian 1983). The first group was naturally 
inclined to a peace agreement with the Netherlands  much of its prof-
its came from the trade of Brazilian sugar, Setubal salt and Baltic 
woods, copper and grain (Godinho 1971: 276, 283-284). 
Finally, the most important effect of the Dutch-Spanish crisis to 
the sugar industry was the Dutch occupation of producing areas in 
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America. In 1624, the WIC grasped for the Portuguese foremost col-
ony in Brazil, at the Bay of All Saints (Bahia)  it failed, nonetheless, 
in dominating its plantation country, and a year later the town was 
liberated by an Iberian armada. In the northern colony of Pernambuco, 
the Dutch were more successful: the invasion of 1630 met strong re-
sistance, but after five years most of the land was under control. In 
time, production in New Holand would reached a peak of six thou-
sand tons, effectively reinitiating competition in the supply of sugar, 
ceasing the long Portuguese monopoly of the sixteenth century. 
 
The conquest of Olinda and Recife in 1630 did not immediately grant 
control of the sugar-producing hinterland of Pernambuco to the WIC. 
The Dutch were isolated in the town and harbor, incapable of breaking 
local resistance. But the Iberian Crowns did not have the strength to 
provide another naval force against the invasion. Raids on the food-
producing areas were effective in eroding the defenses. Between 1633 
and 1636, all of the forts were taken, and the Portuguese started their 
retreat march to Bahia. By 1637, the Dutch Brazil was relatively safe 
from guerrilla campaigns, and the WIC started exporting its own har-
vests  until then, registered sugar exports refer to sugar boxes cap-
tured at the docks and warehouses during the occupation (Wätjen 
1938; Boxer 1957; Mello 21998; 1999). 
The last and most destructive Portuguese campaign against Dutch 
plantations occurred in 1639, after a failed attack against Recife. Two 
Portuguese regiments (terços) disembarked at the extreme northeast of 
the coast in order to march south, back to Bahia, burning sugarcane 
fields and destroying mills as they went. As a retaliation, the WICs 
governor ordered the Dutch fleet to pillage and destroy sugar pro-
duction in the Bahian recôncavo. Both sides agreed then to keep the 
conflict out of the sugar cane plantations, or they would destroy the 
very reason they were fighting for (Silva 1925: 98; Barléu 1940: 198; 
Documentos 1951, I: 14-16).  
As an illustration, Figure A shows the exports of sugar from 
Dutch-controlled colonies, mainly Pernambuco but also Java (under 
supervision of the East India Company, or VOC). From Table 1, one 
will notice the importance of Pernambuco compared to other prov-
inces of the Portuguese colony through a comparison of the number of 
sugar mills operating. However, the number of mills is not a good 
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indicator of production, since many can be out of operation at any 
give period. Moreover, there is no available data on total production 
or exports from Bahia or Rio de Janeiro, except for the account of 
sugar making in one particular mill, the Sergipe do Conde. Therefore, 
similar numbers for the Bahian production need careful estimation, by 
organizing data on production capacity (sugar mills construction and 
slave labor) and prices. 
 
Figure A: Sugar exports from Dutch-controlled colonies 
 
Source: Deerr (1949: 214-215); Puntoni (1999: 99). 
 
The spread of the three-cylinder mill after the 1610s probably ac-
counts for much of the numbers in Table 1, since that innovation not 
only increased productivity but also decreased the cost of construc-
tion. It is possible that the numbers for Bahia and Rio de Janeiro are 
underestimated. Antônio Vieira and Gaspar Dias Ferreira, two men of 
considerable importance at the time, wrote that there were 200 and 
300 mills, respectively, under Portuguese control during the 1640s. 
The Municipal Council of Salvador also mentioned the existence of 
300 sugar mills in the Bahian recôncavo alone, but that number is 
likely to be overstated in order to persuade the Crown to alleviate 
taxes in the province. In 1645, D. João IV ordered more mills to be 
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constructed in Brazil.4 However, since new mills gave tax exemptions 
to their owners, we should consider a bias toward mill construction 
without parallel growth in sugar production. In addition, many of the 
figures for the 1640s must be accounted by the reconstruction of inca-
pacited mills. Therefore, an honest estimate of the number of sugar 
mills operating at that time in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro can only be 
estimated between 200 and 250. 
 
Table 1: Number of sugar mills in Brazil, seventeenth century 
 Bahia Pernambuco Rio de Janeiro 
1570 18 23  
1583-1585 36 66  
1610 63  14 
1612 50 90  
1622  119  
1629 80 150 60 
1639   110 
1662 69   
1675 130   
1710 146 246 136 
Source: Schwartz (1985: 150). 
 
The supply of slave labor also underwent a problematic period. In 
1644, a letter signed by Gaspar de Brito Freyre stated that Bahia relied 
on 11,000 or 12,000 slaves yearly brought from Angola. But that was 
before the Dutch captured Luanda in 1641, ceasing the bulk of that 
commerce. Reducing Native Americans to forced labor or recapturing 
fugitives could hardly make up for the interruption in the slave trade. 
There was a considerable movement of masters and slaves from Per-
nambuco to Bahia after the Dutch occupation, between 1635 and 
1638. But that hardly included more than 4,000 slaves (Schwartz 
1985: 134). Moreover, the peak of slave acquisitions by the sugar mill 
                                                     
4  See Mauro (1989, I: 255-256); Silva (1959: 179). There is record of an invention 
by Belquior da Costa in the minutes of the Municipal Council of 1626, but there 
are no other indications of its nature and adoption among producers (Documentos 
1944-1950, I: 55).  
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in Sergipe do Conde, in 1643-1644 (Figure B), matches the year of the 
smallpox outbreak in Rio de Janeiro, possibly meaning that Bahia also 
suffered from the epidemics. 
 
Figure B: Slave acquisition and average price,  
Engenho Sergipe do Conde 
Source: Anais (1955: 485). 
 
From Figure B, slave prices indicate two upward shocks: 40% be-
tween 1632 and 1635 and 23% between 1645 and 1647. On average, 
slave prices in the 1640s are 18% higher than in the 1630s. That is, 
slave prices had already increased considerably before the Dutch oc-
cupation of Luanda. But it is also visible that even the liberation of 
Angola by a Portuguese expedition in 1648 (led by colonists from Rio 
de Janeiro) did not halt the price hike, which therefore must have been 
influenced by the Dutch-Portuguese conflict as a whole, and not just 
by the dispute over slave markets. 
Construction of mills and slave prices are some of the most impor-
tant factors behind sugar production at the time. According to Frédéric 
Mauro, in 1643 Rio de Janeiro alone produced somewhere between 
15,000 and 17,000 tons; total exports from Brazil reached 26,000 tons 
in 1641, which would indicate a total production in Bahia between 
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9,000 and 11,000 tons. Such numbers, however, overestimate the mass 
of sugar per box. Considering the amount collected by the vintena tax 
(a 5% duty on production) between 1642 and 1646, keeping in mind 
the flexible variety of exemptions to new mills and members of reli-
gious orders, we can estimate a minimum of 6,000 tons per year pro-
duced in Bahia. Sugar production in the Portuguese colonies as a 
whole during the 1640s must have been somewhere between 16,000 
and 22,000 tons, which already indicates that production nearly dou-
bled since the 1610s, despite the loss of Pernambuco (the largest of 
the sugar colonies). 
As far as sugar prices are concerned, there are records of historical 
floors and ceilings (in the minutes of the Municipal Council at Salva-
dor) and of prices obtained by the mill at Sergipe do Conde between 
1622 and 1653. Two historical low points were registered by the 
Council: in 1626, producers complained that prices were halved, trig-
gering widespread insolvency and dismemberment of farms and mills. 
The Council then fixed prices for the arroba of white, medium, low, 
brown and panela sugar ($750, $700, $600, $360 and $240 respec-
tively). The same occurred in 1642, when Council negotiations set the 
prices of sugar delivered by inhabitants to their debtors; this time at 
1$000, $900, $800, $550 and $240. These prices were negotiated by a 
commission of two producers, two merchants and two members of the 
Council (Mauro 1989, I: 323). In 1646, the opposite measure was 
taken, and the price of an arroba was limited at a ceiling of 1$600 
because it was more expensive than in Portugal. According to David 
G. Smith, in 1646 the arroba of sugar in Portugal was worth some 
3$500 réis (Smith 1975: 342). 
Price movements can also be reconstructed through the surviving 
balance sheets of the Sergipe do Conde mill (Figures C and D). The 
most striking observation is that prices hiked between the harvests of 
1634-1635 and 1637-1638  a rise in 73% for white sugar and 64% 
for brown, while production decreased 69 and 59% respectively. 
There is less data available for the decades of 1640 and 1650, but it is 
possible to underline that the price of sugar never returned to its levels 
in the 1630s. 
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Figures C and D: Production and prices, white and brown sugar,  
Sergipe do Conde 
Source: Ferlini (1980: 229). 
 
 
Figures E and F: Farming of tithes and the verde, Bahia 
Source: Mauro (1989, I); Documentos (1944-1950, I-II).5 
 
                                                     
5  When using tithes collection as a proxy for price and production, one should bear 
in mind that it is only a very crude indication of fluctuations on the total value of 
sugar production, considering the vast amount of exemptions and particularities. 
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As Frédéric Mauro has already remarked, such price curves show a 
level of parallelism with the values for farming the collection of 
tithes. Here we have combined tithe contracts with the values of the 
renda do verde, a small farming of fines and weight inspection by the 
city of Salvador (Figures E and F). 
The trend in Bahian sugar prices during the 1630s can be ex-
plained by the war in Pernambuco. With Olinda and Recife under 
foreign rule, exports of sugar brought through the Capiberibe and Be-
beribe rivers were halted; sugar prices in Bahia rose out of a ten-year 
low and levelled at a slightly higher ground until 1634. During the 
Dutch offensive of 1635, the Fort Narazé at the Cape of Saint 
Augustine was taken, closing another export route on the coast (for 
sugar produced in the southern plantations of the colony, particularly 
those around the rivers Serinhaém and Paraguaçu). Sugar exports from 
Pernambuco were compromised, and many must have resorted to the 
markets of Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, soaring its prices.  
However, there were problems even for sugar produced in the Ba-
hian recôncavo. Due to the assault of Dutch corsairs on Portuguese 
navigation, sugar exports from Bahia also suffered. In 1634, the Por-
tuguese governor in Salvador desperately prohibited the crossing of 
sugar to Europe. Stored in the docks, without good prospects of trans-
portation, sugar was worthless. Since the merchant fleet would only 
receive decent escort to cross the ocean in 1636, it is very likely that 
much of that merchandise went rotten. The prices of freshly made 
sugar were hiking, as indicated by the Sergipe do Conde balances. But 
dealers with accumulated losses (due to rotten stocks) and with a bad 
credit relationship were not able to profit from hiking prices. The fall 
of production in the Sergipe do Conde mill, which at this time proc-
essed only sugarcane from third parties, testifies to a crisis among 
planters (lavradores). 
In 1636, the colonial government reenacted the law that protected 
planters and mill owners against their creditors. In order to preserve 
the capacity of production from market movements, the Crown had 
always forbidden the settlement of debts through the seizure of any 
means of production  slaves, boilers, boats and ox-carts  by unpaid 
creditors. Thus, indebted producers could remain in business (Docu-
mentos 1928-1955, XVI: 388-391; Pinho 1982: 276). The reenactment 
of that law indicates a period of striking insolvency among planters 
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and mill owners. In a scenario such as the 1634-1636 navigation cri-
sis, it was crucial for producers to have a good relationship with credit 
sources  a friend or family member, a good connection with one of 
the clerical orders. Those were the ones who could not only sustain 
their  production, but profit from the situation. 
It should be noted that the 1630s turbulence in the sugar market 
rearranged much of the Portuguese trade with its American colonies. 
While the bankruptcy of the Spanish Crown had attracted the elite of 
Portuguese financiers to Madrid, the losses in the Atlantic navigation 
to Dutch piracy in 1627-1628 and 1633-1634 aggravated a shrinking 
of merchant capital in the sugar trade  very few were able to bear its 
risks. In 1630, in Lisbon, there is talk of a lack of capital and busi-
nessmen, and the Council requests the Crowns authorization to ad-
mit foreign capital in the city (Costa 2002, I: 71-72). Still, during the 
1630s the losses in the Atlantic were highly compensated by the 
great price given for sugar, earned by those who could manage its 
crossing and sustain the colonial trade. This was the fountain which 
irrigated a generation of new fortunes, raising merchants who would 
soon be able to financially support the duke of Braganças claim to the 
throne (Godinho 1971, II: 255). 
 
The Portuguese Restoration of December 1640 had an immediate ef-
fect on the conflict. Portugal and the United Provinces signed into an 
anti-Spanish alliance as early as 1641, a deal which included formal 
recognition of the Dutch possession of Pernambuco. The conflict in 
Brazil had already lost intensity since 1640, and Portuguese naviga-
tion in the Atlantic was again safe from corsairs. In Salvador, sugar 
prices fell, probably indicating the recovery of production after the 
1634-1636 slump. But it was also a reflection of the competition with 
sugar exported by the Dutch in Pernambuco. The Council negotiated a 
minimum price in 1642. At the same time, the Portuguese sugar trade 
with Amsterdam was reopened. Figures G and H, with index prices of 
sugar in Bahia and Amsterdam, provide a good image of that. 
In that sense, the Restoration would be a fatal blow to the WIC, in 
spite of the Portuguese recognition of the New Holand colony. With 
Portugal allied to the United Provinces, much of the companys role in 
fighting the Spanish was lost. Furthermore, the Dutch colony in Per-
nambuco had internal problems. In 1637 and 1641, with the conquests 
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of São Jorge da Mina and Luanda in the West African coast, the Dutch 
had set their foot in the slave trade, guaranteeing a labor force for its 
plantations. But most of the sugar-producing country was dominated 
by Portuguese inhabitants, through purchases and concessions. Even if 
most of them were on good terms with Dutch rule, the business of 
sugar producing required a protection against commercial mishaps. 
We have seen this in Bahia when the 1634-1636 navigation crisis 
brought pressure on sugarcane planters. But the colonial government 
of the Dutch WIC, being it a company with shares in the Amsterdam 
Exchange, could not afford such liberality. 
 
Figures G and H: Index numbers for sugar prices,  
Bahia and Amsterdam 
Source: Ferlini (1980: 241-244).6 
 
In 1643, when four thousand African slaves disembarked in Recife 
(four times more than in the previous years), the insolvency of sugar 
mill owners was already startling. Sugar prices in Amsterdam were on 
the fall. The Dutch governor in Recife, an intelligent count from Ger-
many, was aware of the problem and avoided the collection of debts. 
                                                     
6  It was impossible to set a basis for indexation on prices, since sugar prices for 
Bahia are related to harvests (1622-1623 or 1623-1624, for example), while Ams-
terdam prices are yearly averages. Since the purpose of these figures is to show 
parallelism in price tendencies, we saw no problem in establishing 1622-
1623=100 for Bahian prices and 1624=100 for Amsterdam prices. 
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As a result, he was losing his support from the companys board of 
directors in Amsterdam. A declining market price for the WICs 
shares put pressure on the board, who eventually replaced the gover-
nor in 1644. After he had left to Europe, sugar producers in Pernam-
buco were hardly pressed by the WICs financial problems. After a 
sequence of embarrassments and disputes, in 1645 the sugar mill own-
ers revolted against Dutch rule. 
With support of the new Portuguese dynasty through Bahia, the 
revolt quickly gained control of the country and succeeded in isolating 
the Dutch in Recife. As early as 1646, sugar from Pernambuco was 
being boarded in Portuguese ships at the Cape of Saint Augustine. In 
Bahia, the revolt of Pernambuco made prices rise from the early 1640s 
low. Prices in Amsterdam reflect the upward trend. But as the Dutch 
were again isolated in Recife, they could only resort to naval warfare, 
by preying upon the enemys ships. Their hope was to inflict enough 
damage on Portuguese shipping so that the conflict would return to a 
stalemate. The King of Portugal would be forced to negotiate, possibly 
withdrawing his support to the revolt. During 1648 and 1649, with the 
help of a corsair company from Zeeland, the Dutch nearly closed the 
Atlantic for Portuguese trade. 
However, the Portuguese sugar trade at this time had enough capi-
tal and political power to arrange a fleet system, which they had not 
been able to do in 1627. A General Company for the Commerce of 
Brazil was chartered, with the responsibility of providing naval escort 
to merchant ships and with a monopoly of the four most important 
metropolitan goods in the colony: cod, salt, wine and olive oil (Costa 
2002). Although the Companys privileges caused opposition among 
the colonists, the fleet system succeeded in safeguarding the naviga-
tion between Portugal and Brazil. The third fleet sailing under the 
Companys administration was the one responsible for the final blow 
on the WIC hold of Recife, and the Dutch surrended in January 1654. 
With the end of the conflict, did Portuguese sugar production re-
gain its predominance in the business? Most importantly, did the Lis-
bon-Amsterdam connection return to the center of sugar trade, as it 
was in the late sixteenth century? After all, the parallelism observed in 
price tendencies during the 1640s indicate the resilience of Portu-
guese-Flemish trade. The Spanish monarchy failed to dismantle this 
relationship and lost the Portuguese Crown in part because of that. It 
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is equally true that the Dutch West India Company also failed to hold 
the Portuguese sugar-producing areas under its control. Nonetheless, 
the sugar trade underwent a vast transformation during these thirty 
years, both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of distribu-
tion. 
 
Approximately between 1630 and 1650, sugar production was at-
tempted in the Caribbean. Slowly, it would be learned about by the 
British and French colonies which had established themselves during 
the Dutch war against Iberian rule of the New World. 
In 1639, the governors of the island of St. Kitts7 agreed to destroy 
the tobacco fields and start the production of sugar. By 1643, the 
French side had started its production, a year before the British. How-
ever, only in the 1660s did sugar production surpass indigo in total 
exports. The island of Martinique was the site of a sugar-producing 
attempt by the Compagnie des îles dAmérique, after a decision taken 
in 1638. The company gave 3,000 acres to a Rouen merchant, Me. 
Trezel, to initiate the production. Despite his personal effort and in-
vestment, Trezel met with resistance from local inhabitants and from 
the dense native jungle; his first sugarcane harvest was ready only in 
1647. But the industry did not grow, not even after the arrival of 
Dutch experts in 1663. Until then, sugar was produced more as a re-
freshing drink than as an export good (Deerr 1949, II: 92). 
Contrasting with the experiences of St. Kitts and Martinique, the 
sugar industry swept Barbados like a revolution. Since the occupation 
of the island in 1627, the island produced tobacco and cotton, mainly 
with contracts of indentured labor. It was a promising colony to the 
windward of all the Antilles, it was out of reach for any Spanish attack 
from Central America. In addition, there were no hostile natives as on 
many of the other islands. Nevertheless, the fall of tobacco and cotton 
prices in Europe in the early 1640s (along with sugar prices, as we 
have seen) meant a crisis of export value for Barbadian goods, trigger-
ing a wave of emigration. Meanwhile, the outbreak of civil war in 
England led the local government to declare neutrality, and communi-
cation with the metropolis practically ceased. Therefore, the inden-
                                                     
7  The small island was being shared by the British and the French since 1625. 
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tured labor contracts which sustained the islands economy was also 
halted (Green 1988; Emmer 1998). 
This void in the Barbados export-import trade was filled by Dutch 
WIC merchants who were based at the island of Curaçao and by mer-
chants of the English Guinea Company, which had not stopped its 
activities. Both these groups had a strong position in the slave trade, 
and so they offered the inhabitants of Barbados a complete package 
for the sugar industry: financing, capital goods, freights and export 
markets. Sugar prices in Europe were declining then, while indigo 
prices were on the rise. The colonists could have just as well chosen 
indigo instead of sugar to overcome the crisis. But their entry into 
trade was ultimately determined by the conditions of the slave trade. 
After 1645, when the WIC was in control of two major West Afri-
can outposts (São Jorge da Mina and Luanda), the revolt of sugar pro-
ducers in Pernambuco left its slave trade without a market. Even after 
the Portuguese liberated Luanda in 1648, the WIC remained in control 
of slave exports from Mina. The development of a new sugar business 
in the Caribbean was the cornerstone which sustained the WIC after 
the 1650s mainly as a supplier of slaves to new sugar plantations and 
mills. That was what caused the Barbadian sugar revolution. 
Therefore, during the war the Portuguese-Flemish sugar trade was 
cleavaged into rival merchant groups. First, there were Portuguese 
sugar traders in Amsterdam who fled to alternative ports. In time, 
Hamburg would emerge as a major refining center for Brazilian sugar. 
After the Restoration of 1640, sugar interests gained strong support 
from the Portuguese Crown, which succeeded in expelling the Dutch 
WIC from Brazil in 1654. On its turn, the WIC managed to survive in 
the business by developing a large slave-sugar market in the Carib-
bean, which would eventually trigger the development of French and 
British plantations. 
Simultaneously, yet on another level of events, the decadence of 
Spanish preponderance in Europe paved the way for renewed expan-
sionist struggle between states. Since Madrid was on the retreat, others 
sought to occupy strategic positions in the empire-building game, and 
colonial trade was right in the middle of it.  
As far as the sugar business is concerned, this resulted in a spread 
of mercantilistic practices. During the 1660s, the British and the 
French closed their markets to colonial imports, in order to favor their 
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own sugar refinery industries. As a merchant from Paris would later 
say, the best sugar comes from Brazil, but its trade has almost disap-
peared. That accelerated the development of sugar production in the 
Caribbean and divided the sugar market in Europe: in brief, there was 
a partition of production, then a partition of refining (an essential 
operation) and, finally, a partition of the market (Braudel 1996, II: 
164-165). 
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